Abstract
ABSTRACT Towards the end of her life, Iris Murdoch attempted (but did not succeed) to write a monograph on Heidegger. In this paper, I argue two things. Firstly, Murdoch’s Heidegger study is more than a mere curiosity – that in fact, Murdoch’s interest in Heidegger was bound up with the most fundamental concerns of her thought. Heidegger functioned for Murdoch as the most dangerous representative of the form of moral scepticism her own moral Platonism was always intended as a counter to. A completed book on Heidegger would thus have been a fitting coda to her authorship. Secondly, however, Murdoch was almost bound never to be able to finish her book on Heidegger – as she seems, in fact, to have lacked an adequate response to the specific variant of the scepticism she took Heidegger to represent. I use this finding to present a puzzle for the scholarship.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
