Lower Bounds for Leakage-Resilient Secret-Sharing Schemes against Probing Attacks

Abstract

Historically, side-channel attacks have revealed partial information about the intermediate values and secrets of computations to compromise the security of cryptographic primitives. The objective of leakage-resilient cryptography is to model such avenues of information leakage and study techniques to realize them securely. This work studies the local leakage-resilience of prominent secret-sharing schemes like Shamir's secret-sharing scheme and the additive secret-sharing scheme against probing attacks that leak physical-bits from the memory hardware storing the secret shares. Consider the additive secret-sharing scheme among <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$k$</tex> parties over a prime field such that the prime needs <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\lambda$</tex> -bits for its binary representation, where <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\lambda$</tex> is the security parameter. We prove that <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$k$</tex> must be at least <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\omega(\log\lambda/\log\log\lambda)$</tex> for the scheme to be secure against even one physical-bit leakage from each secret share. This result improves the previous state-of-the-art result where an identical lower bound was known for one-bit general leakage from each secret share (Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, and Rabin, CRYPTO–2018). This lower bound on the reconstruction threshold extends to Shamir's secret-sharing scheme if one does not carefully choose the evaluation places for generating the secret shares. For this scheme, our result additionally improves another lower bound on the reconstruction threshold <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$k$</tex> of Shamir's secret-sharing scheme (Nielsen and Simkin, EUROCRYPT–2020) when the total number of parties is <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$\mathcal{O}(\lambda\log\lambda/\log\log\lambda)$</tex> . Our work provides the analysis of the recently-proposed (explicit) physical-bit leakage attack of Maji, Nguyen, Paskin-Cherniavsky, Suad, and Wang (EUROCRYPT–2021), namely the “parity of parity” attack. This analysis relies on lower-bounding the “discrepancy” of the Irwin-Hall probability distribution.