Abstract
This paper investigates the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases. Two game scenarios (Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are examined under different channel structures. Furthermore, we introduce government subsidies as an impact factor of low-carbon strategy adoption. In the single-channel (Case 1), we mainly examine the influence of consumers’ price-sensitivity on channel members’ optimal decisions. In the dual-channel (Case 2), we focus on the joint impact of product substitutability and different channel power structures on the optimal decisions under asymmetric related channel status. The analysis suggests that the Stackelberg leaders always perform better than their corresponding followers before emission reduction, while they may not necessarily yield more benefits after emission reduction. The implementation of low-carbon strategy depends on parameters like product substitutability and channel base demand. Finally, all the supply chain members will encounter a Prisoner’s Dilemma when the product substitutability is relatively high.
Highlights
In recent years, with the continued deterioration of the global warming crisis, it has caused a disastrous impact on natural resources and ecological environment
This paper focuses on the influence of different power structures, consumers’ price-sensitivity and product substitutability on manufacturers’, retailers’ and the entire supply chain’s pricing and emission reduction strategy in a single channel and a dual exclusive channel
This paper investigates the impact of consumers’ price-sensitivity, product substitutability and power structures on channel members’ and the entire supply chain’s pricing and emission reduction
Summary
With the continued deterioration of the global warming crisis, it has caused a disastrous impact on natural resources and ecological environment. What is the influence of channel power structures and product substitutability on the performance of channel members and the entire supply chain? Li et al [29] develop Stackelberg game model to investigate the pricing and greening strategies for the chain members under both decentralized and centralized scenarios They point out that manufacturer will not add a direct channel if the greening cost satisfies certain conditions. Different from the previous literature, this paper indicates that the leaders always perform better than the followers before emission reduction, while they may not necessarily gain more benefits after emission reduction Both retailers and manufacturers will benefit from the implementation of low-carbon strategy when product substitutability and the asymmetric relative channel status are sufficiently low.
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