Low-carbon promotion of new energy vehicles: A quadrilateral evolutionary game

Abstract

This study explores the impact of the behavioral strategies of manufacturers, consumers, recyclers, and the government on carbon emissions reduction in the whole life cycle of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China by establishing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model. It analyzes the influence of relevant factors on the carbon emissions of NEVs and ranks them accordingly. The study identifies low-carbon production by manufacturers, green product purchases by consumers, self-built recycling systems by recyclers, and production subsidies by the government as the future direction for the development of NEVs. Promotion strategies are proposed for carbon emission reduction of NEVs. The research results indicate that consumers' preference for low-carbon products can benefit manufacturers, and their green consumption behavior will not change until consumer subsidies reach a certain level. The government can implement consumer subsidy policies to increase consumers' motivation for green purchasing. Production subsidies can alleviate the transformation pressure of manufacturers towards low-carbon production, allowing them to focus on important factors such as opportunity costs and market benefits. The strategy choices of recyclers are influenced by dismantling costs and recycling profits. Furthermore, when the profitability of low-carbon production for manufacturers is guaranteed, they are more willing to take responsibility for recycling waste NEVs. The government has different benefits in the process of production and consumer subsidies, and its subsidy strategy choices are also influenced by the decisions of manufacturers and consumers. This makes the government to implement a dynamic subsidy system based on the producer responsibility system.