Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper, we deal with lotteries to finance the preservation of the global commons and we carry out simulations on an agent-based artificial society model. Focusing on the preservation of the global commons, such as the atmospheric quality, we show that financing by means of lotteries with selective incentives is effective, as compared to voluntary contributions without those incentives, when the condition of the global commons does not become excessively worse.
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