Lost cause: consequences and implications of the war on terror

Abstract

By 2001, the al-Qaida movement had evolved into a transnational revolutionary movement with an eschatological dimension, facilitating the 9/11 attacks to gain religious support and incite a strong reaction. The Bush administration was particularly tough in its response, terminating the Taliban regime and then declaring the right of pre-emption against a wider axis of evil, which led on to regime termination in Iraq and the intended constraining of Iran. In the event, regime termination in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in protracted wars that were intensely costly in human and resource terms, and Iranian influence actually increased. The al-Qaida movement was dispersed while being transformed into a potent idea with little in the way of an organised structure, yet was effective in catalysing movements from South Asia through the Middle East to sub-Saharan Africa. Analyses of events in Iraq and Afghanistan point to deep misconceptions over the potential for the use of military force and of imposed state building. After more than a decade after 9/11, there has been a re-orientation away from large-scale occupations towards more remote means of maintaining control, with an emphasis on armed drones, special forces and privatised military companies. This approach appears initially appropriate and attractive but may be as counterproductive as the previous approach.