Los variados sentidos del conocimiento en las primeras obras de Agustín

Abstract

This article examines Augustine’s thought conceming the relationship between sensation and knowledge in his early dialogues. A special focus is on Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum. First, I determine Augustine’s epistemological starting point by examining his thought as it appears in Contra Académicos (386). Second, I study the relationship between sensation and knowledge in De quantitate animae (387-388) and observe the development in Augustine’s thought concerning sense-perception. Finally, I analyse Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum, which occurs in De quantitate animae, and make some important observations about the relationship between sensation and knowledge in Augustine’s early thought. In this regard Augustine’s possible influences are also considered. The conclusion of this article is that although Augustine had adopted a version of Platonic epistemology that is very critical toward sense-perception, his considerations in De quantitate animae, especially regarding cognitio per sensum, point towards a more harmonious relationship between the two than his Platonic epistemology in Contra Academicos would lead us to think.