Los instrumentos de control parlamentario de la Ley de Presupuestos Generales del Estado

Abstract

Modern democratic States, forged around the nuclear idea of a written Constitution as an instrument for the limitation of Power, have in time shaped the principles of control and responsibility as elements that are inherent to the very idea of democracy. It is typical and substantial of a democratic state to adopt a Constitution and to emerge in law ordination as a limited state, endowed with responsible public powers subjected to a control over its decisions that is exerted by those who represent the public will. With the passing of time, these notions of responsibility and account rendering have constructed a theory for the control of constitutional organisations and the activity of Public Administration itself, which have represented, to a great extent, the foundations of the Rule of Law. The ways and means in which this control has been constitutionalised or legalised are many and varied, depending to a certain extent on evolution from an absolute state to a constitutional state, later undergoing profound transformations, ending in the current social and democratic state of the present constitutions of the countries that integrate the European Union, where control and responsibility are today mutually assumed concepts. This research work seeks to verify the adequacy of certain behaviours with regard to political mandate and legal ordination, according to the different cases, in which any form of inadequacy meets with implicit or explicit sanction or reprobation. As the state has become more democratic, this control has become more sophisticated. Thus, one of its specialisations has given rise to political parliamentary control over the Budget and financial economic control over the Public sector of the state. LOS INSTRUMENTOS DE CONTROL PARLAMENTARIO DE LA LEY DE PRESUPUESTOS... 195