Abstract
In the sequencing context, we explore the possibility of designing mechanisms which uphold the notion of justness and safeguard an agent’s individual interest. Every agent is guaranteed a minimum level of utility by imposing the generalized minimum welfare bound. Our main result shows that the constrained egalitarian mechanism is Lorenz optimal in the class of mechanisms that are feasible and satisfy the generalized minimum welfare bound.
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