Abstract

Recent scholarship on early Sino-British relations has begun challenging the longstanding projection of inevitability upon the First Anglo-Chinese War (1839–1842) by illuminating diverse opinions within each side rather than highlighting an inherent tension between “modern” Britain and “traditional” China. However, the assumption that the Macartney Embassy (1792–1794) served as the first major step toward war has gone largely unchallenged because its diplomatic drama and economic disputes appear to affirm the British and Qing Empires’ supposedly irreconcilable differences. This article examines Britons’ reactions to the Macartney Embassy through travelogues, periodicals, and diplomatic documents to reconstruct the Embassy free from the hindsight of war and the imposition of free trade upon the Qing in the Treaty of Nanjing (1842). It argues that late eighteenth-century Britons variably conceived of the Embassy as a success, dismissed it as inconsequential, or weaponized it for domestic political criticisms. They accordingly supported both optimism in the future of Sino-British relations and a deferent stance toward Britain’s Qing counterparts. The idea that the Embassy exemplified hostility between Britain and China only came about through John Barrow’s reactionary writings during the early nineteenth century that sought to defend Macartney’s conduct by foregrounding the Qing’s apparently impolite behavior. Barrow’s views took root after accounts of the Qing’s treatment of the Amherst Embassy (1816–1817) depicted this behavior as a pattern. In this way, Britons’ initial reactions to the Macartney Embassy complicate clear notions of a linear, causal relationship between the Embassy and the war. They rather suggest that these notions were invented through a misuse of hindsight by early nineteenth-century Britons and solidified by later historians.

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