LOOKING TOWARD THE END: REVISITING AQUINAS' TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS

Abstract

Ever since Veritatis Splendor laid claim to the idea that the principle factor in determining the morality of human activity was the choice of the object of a human act, I have been intrigued by the challenge that this presents to anyone who is persuaded by the idea that human activity can only be morally evaluated after all the relevant factors have been taken into account. To follow the argument of the encyclical one step further, the claim that the goodness or malice of the human will is determined by the choice of the object of human action appears to be both a plausible interpretation of the Catholic moral tradition and also a somewhat narrow view of moral discernment. It is plausible because the entire tradition of the manuals of moral theology maintained that it is primarily the object of human activity, that behavior which a person performs, that can be sufficient for determining whether or not a sin has been committed. Other considerations about circumstances and intentions serve only to mitigate or accentuate accountability (guilt) on the part of the agent (acting person). The presence or absence of an ‘objective sin’ can be determined by the consideration of the object alone. It is a narrow view of moral discernment because, expressed in this manner, it focuses exclusively upon behavior without any consideration of the human person as committed to a life project. It is not difficult to imagine persons acting on impulse, giving in to certain weaknesses, or making mistakes. It is also possible that some human decisions can be simply and spontaneously malicious. However, one could validly ask whether this is an adequate image for outlining a ‘Christian anthropology’ or of describing how we would prefer to envision moral life. The classical explanation for this approach lies in the neo-scholastic interpretations of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. In this opinion, the moral evaluation of the human act depends first upon the object (ST, I-II,18,2), followed by an evaluation of the circumstances (18,3) and then confirmed by a consideration of the end of the agent (18,4). Countless interpreters of the Summa have agreed upon this analysis, not the least of whom was the Belgian Dominican, Servais Pinckaers. In one of his commentaries he wrote,