Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify the conditions under which three different relationship marketing mechanisms-- long-term relationships, partnerships and strategic alliances--are most efficient. The contingency theory that is developed is based on, and extends, the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework. The TCE framework is modified in one respect, opportunism is assumed to vary across exchange relationships. In those relationships that are characterized by relational norms (absence of opportunism), the TCE governance mechanisms--markets, hierarchies and hybrids--are argued to be inefficient relative to the mechanisms of relationship marketing.

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