Long-Term Policy and Short-Term Problems, October 1964–October 1965

Abstract

Britain’s decision to withdraw its military presence from South-East Asia was made by Harold Wilson’s Labour Government, following a series of defence reviews. The first was initiated in November 1964 after ministers decided to reduce defence spending by about 10 per cent, to £2000 million per annum at 1964 prices by the financial year 1969–70. Its purpose was to reassess British global defence commitments in terms of London’s need to reduce defence expenditure. In November 1964, after agreeing to a defence-spending ceiling, ministers decided on a long-term policy for South-East Asia, assuming that eventually Britain’s role in the region would cease to be a military one. However, in October 1964 a strategy for the shutting down of military bases and withdrawal of troops was not yet in place. While the new government believed that, over the long term, London would have to withdraw from South-East Asia, it was concerned about the impact that this policy would have on both Britain’s global status and its influence over the short term. Thus, despite decolonisation in the region over the previous decade, and the recent creation of the Federation of Malaysia, a majority in Wilson’s Cabinet agreed that Britain still had important commitments in South-East Asia, and that the region depended on the presence of British forces. London also had obligations to defend Australia and New Zealand and needed to maintain an alliance with the United States.