Long-term compensation and risk taking: exploring the role of crisis in CEOs' behavior toward mergers and acquisitions

Abstract

PurposeCorporate governance scholars have built on agency theory premises to document chief executive officers' (CEOs’) debt-based compensation, also known as inside debt, as an effective tool to control excessive risk and deter risky corporate strategies. In this study, the authors draw on behavioral agency model to put these well-established assumptions to the test in a different setting and argue for the context-specific effects of CEOs' long-term compensation.Design/methodology/approachFocusing on corporate mergers and acquisitions in a post-crisis period (2011–2017), the authors cast doubt on agency theory predictions on debt-like compensation, point to the more realistic assumptions of behavioral decision models, and call for more contingency approaches in theoretical arguments.FindingsAn analysis of more than 4000 observations reveals that neither CEOs nor shareholders react significantly to inside debt after the economy recovers. Firm risk is also influenced only marginally by long-term compensation in a normal period of time.Originality/valueWhile extant literature is rather unanimous on risk-reducing impact of inside debt, the study periods span the financial crisis of 2007. This research is the first conducted in regular times to demonstrate that previous findings are biased and heavily influenced by an exogenous shock.