Long-Run Economic Performance in the European Periphery: Russia and Turkey

Abstract

SUMMARY This paper first analyzes the question why did Czarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey fall behind the West? It is argued that interstate rivalry forced West European rulers to respect the private property rights of producers and subjects earlier and to a greater degree than czars or sultans ruling over huge contiguous territories ever had to. Incentives to work were better in Europe than elsewhere. The mobilization of available knowledge for productive purposes was easier than elsewhere. Limited government implied less political obstacles to innovation. Comparatively secure private property ownership in the means of production made the establishment of scarcity prices and the rational allocation of resources easier than elsewhere. Whereas the Western past was feudal, the Russian or Turkish past was patrimonial or even sultanistic. Feudalism is a much better starting point for establishing the rule of law and safe property rights than patrimonialism. The second issue has been the question why Czarist Russia could outperform Ottoman Turkey. Here the political consequences of the Muslim tolerance of slavery and polygyny matter. Being slaves, many members of Ottoman ruling elites were at the mercy of their owner, the sultan. Therefore, they became tools of arbitrary rule. Moreover, the practice of polygyny generated downward social mobility and political instability and thereby added another obstacle to the establishment of safe property rights for producers or merchants. The final issue is the economic prospects of Russia or Turkey. Economic freedom is better in Turkey than in Russia. Moreover, Russia is graying, whereas Turkey may look forward to a growing labor force. Although a rich endowment in natural resources seems to favor Russia, the resource curse has prevented other resource rich countries from developing. Therefore, the Turkish prospect looks much brighter than the Russian one.