Logit selection promotes cooperation in voluntary public goods game

Abstract

In this paper, we present a simple yet effective model to promote cooperation in selfish population, namely, a spatial evolutionary public goods game model that includes three kinds of players: cooperator, defector and loner. In spatial settings, the players locate on a regular lattice, and each player randomly selects one strategy, then all the player acquire their payoffs with their four nearest neighbors, after that the focal player chooses a neighbor based on the logit selection model and updates his/her strategy in accordance with a random sequential simulation procedure. The Monte Carlo simulation results demonstrate that the ruthless invasion of defectors can be efficiently prevented by the loners, especially when enhanced factor r is low. Further interesting is the fact that the introduction of a logit selection model, making the fittest neighbors more likely to act as sources of adopted strategies, effectively promotes the evolution of cooperation even if the loner is absence.