Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning.

Abstract

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model, proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b), which suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategy has been supported by several recent studies. These have shown that statistical reasoners make inferences based on using information about premises in order to generate a likelihood estimate of conclusion probability. However, while results concerning counterexample reasoners are consistent with a counterexample detection model, these results could equally be interpreted as indicating a greater sensitivity to logical form. In order to distinguish these 2 interpretations, in Studies 1 and 2, we presented reasoners with Modus ponens (MP) inferences with statistical information about premise strength and in Studies 3 and 4, naturalistic MP inferences with premises having many disabling conditions. Statistical reasoners accepted the MP inference more often than counterexample reasoners in Studies 1 and 2, while the opposite pattern was observed in Studies 3 and 4. Results show that these strategies must be defined in terms of information processing, with no clear relations to "logical" reasoning. These results have additional implications for the underlying debate about the nature of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record