Abstract

Mathematicians often speak of the evidence for unproved conjectures, such as the Riemann Hypothesis. It is argued that such evidence should be seen in terms of logical probability in Keynes's sense: a strictly logical degree of partial implication. That is essentially the same as objective Bayesianism. Examples are given and explained in terms of the objective logical strength of evidence.

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