Logical form, mathematical practice, and Frege's Begriffsschrift

Abstract

For over a century we have been reading Frege's Begriffsschrift notation as a variant of standard notation. But Frege's notation can also be read differently, in a way enabling us to understand how reasoning in Begriffsschrift is at once continuous with and a significant advance beyond earlier mathematical practices of reasoning within systems of signs. It is this second reading that I outline here, beginning with two preliminary claims. First, I show that one does not reason in specially devised systems of signs of mathematics as one reasons in natural language; the signs are not abbreviations of words. Then I argue that even given a system of signs within which to reason in mathematics, there are two ways one can read expressions involving those signs, either mathematically or mechanically. These two lessons are then applied to a reading of Frege's proof of Theorem 133 in Part III of his 1879 logic, a proof that Frege claims is at once strictly deductive and ampliative, a real extension of our knowledge. In closing, I clarify what this might mean, and how it might be possible.