Abstract
This chapter examines James Conant’s account of Gottlob Frege’s conception of the special character of the laws of logic. It also examines whether or how that conception figures in Frege’s opposition to ‘psychologistic logicians’ who apparently envisage the possibility of laws of logic contrary to our own. Conant asks two important questions: ‘What is the status of the laws of logic?’ and ‘Wherein does their necessity lie?’. Conant seems to be seeking some explanation of the necessity of necessary truths, or of the impossibility of their being false. The chapter challenges the ‘difficulty’ that Conant claims Frege has in presenting his arguments regarding the laws of logic, as well as his attributing to Frege some kind of explanation of the ‘source’ or ‘ground’ of the special character of logical laws.
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