Logic, Scripture, and Hermeneutics in Zhencheng’s Critique of the Thesis of No-motion

Abstract

This paper examines the philosophical debate on Seng Zhao (僧肇 384–414)’s Thesis on No-Motion of Things (Wu buqian lun 物不遷論, hereafter WBQL), a debate which took place approximately at the turn of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. Without doubt the Zhao Treatise (Zhao lun 肇論) is the most precious gem in the early Chinese Madhyamaka legacy. The sterling reputation of this seminal treatise had never been challenged until Zhencheng (鎮澄 1546–1617) published the Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things (Wu buqian zhengliang lun 物不遷正量論, hereafter WBQZLL) during 1588–1589. The following focuses on Zhencheng’s WBQZLL to see how he applied hetu-vidyā in his hermeneutical project. How did Zhencheng employ the syllogism in his critique of the Zhao Treatise? Is his critique justifiable? How is the role of syllogism employed as a hermeneutic tool to understand classical Buddhist texts? In highlighting the innovative features in the application of hetu-vidyā in the late Ming Chinese Buddhist scholasticism as showcased in Zhencheng’s WBQZLL, The controversies swirling around Zhencheng’s challenge to traditional doctrinal authority reveal the distinctive contrast between two forms of Buddhist hermeneutics in the late Ming Buddhist scholasticism: experiential hermeneutics and analytical hermeneutics. While the former has long been practiced in the mainstream of Chinese Buddhism (especially Chan), the latter has received little attention.