“Logic dictates that they may attack when they feel they can win:” The 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli Intelligence

Abstract

Scholars usually agree that the Israeli decision to attack Egypt in October 1956 was motivated by fear of an impending attack by the Egyptian army. That fear was spurred by the news of a large arms deal concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in September 1955. However, Czechoslovak and Soviet reports, used here for the first time, reveal that the Egyptian army was encountering serious difficulties while trying to absorb these weapons. Newly declassified military intelligence assessments reveal that Israeli analysts maintained, even after the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, that the Egyptian army was no match to the IDF. The article goes on to explore the strategic consideration that stood behind the Israeli decision to go to war. At the end of October 1956, Israel joined forces with Britain and France and attacked Egypt. For Britain and France, the immediate trigger for the decision to launch a military operation against Egypt was the announcement by Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which had been under joint Anglo-French ownership. However, Nasser's support for the resistance movement in Algeria and his efforts to subvert pro-British Arab regimes in Jordan and Iraq also contributed to the Anglo-French motivation to bring about Nasser's downfall. The Israeli decision to go to war at the end of 1956 is described by historians of this period as being influenced by several factors, such as the Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits, the continuous Palestinian infiltration from Gaza into the Negev, the activity of the fedayin during late 1955 and early 1956, and the fear that, if not dealt with promptly, Nasser would be able to unite the Arab world and lead it into a war against Israel. Still, among all these factors, the fear of an impending Egyptian attack is considered one of the factors, if not the prominent factor.1 That fear was aroused by the Egyptian announcement of a massive arms deal with the Soviet Union at the end of September 1955 - a deal known as the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms deal, since Czechoslovakia was acting as Moscow's proxy.2 Allegedly, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's Prime Minister, had assumed that once the Egyptian army acquired the sophisticated weapons that flowed from the Eastern Bloc, it would attack Israel. The escalation of hostilities on the Israeli-Egyptian border at the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956 seemed to confirm that the confidence of the Egyptian army was growing and that it was indeed poised to attack Israel. However, when the Israeli army invaded Sinai at the end of October 1956, the fears that the Czech arms deal had somehow transformed the Egyptian army into a mighty war machine proved groundless, as the Egyptian army collapsed in front of advancing Israeli troops. Furthermore, no evidence of preparations to attack Israel was found. But what if Israel had known all this in advance? What if it had had a reliable way to gauge Egyptian military capabilities, as well as Egyptian intentions, before the war erupted? Would the Israeli leadership still have decided to join forces with Britain and France against Egypt? Newly declassified Israeli intelligence assessments and cabinet and General Staff discussions prove that Israel had foreknowledge of the true state of Egypt's armed forces. Moreover, newly declassified documents from the Soviet and Czech archives, which include reports from the Czechoslovak weapon instructors stationed in Egypt, show that this information was reliable. But if the Egyptian army posed little threat to Israel, why did Israel decide to attack Egypt? The last section of this article will try to piece together this historical puzzle. CZECHOSLOVAK WEAPONS INSTRUCTORS AND THE STATE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY Most of the relevant documents in the Czech military archives do not directly discuss the activity of the Czechoslovak weapons instruction teams that were sent to Egypt in 1956. …