Logic and Modal Intuitions

Abstract

Claims concerning what is or is not possible abound in contemporary phi losophy. The epistemology of such claims, however, remains largely unex plored. Anything imaginable is possible, we are told, with the proviso that imag ination be governed by logic. Many who defend this methodology argue that logic frees us from recourse to some mysterious a priori faculty of intuition. Anything is possible so long as it does not contain a contradiction?and we don't need intuition to tell us what is contradictory, just logic. Logic is thus supposed to provide us with a non-mysterious, intuition-free, modal epistemology. The purpose of this paper is to argue that logic does not deliver on this promise. The argument proceeds along two fronts. First, I argue that logic is not sufficient for the task. Not only are there consistent but impossible propositions, there are even inconsistent propositions that are possible. Second, and more fundamen tally, I question the epistemic independence of appeals to logical consistency. I will argue that in judging a proposition to be consistent we rely upon our intu itions concerning what is possible. In other words, our modal beliefs undergird our judgments about consistency and not vice-versa.