Logic and genesis of a scientific theory in the light of the concept of the “speculative cognitive level” developed by V. P. Bransky

Abstract

His article discusses the concept of “speculative theoretical level of research”, developed byBransky and summarizing his earlier philosophical and methodological study of the enormous volume of material of modern physics (especially theory of elementary particles). The history of theoretical physics testifies to the fact that the most basic conceptsbe obtained by means of the inductive generalization of experimental data. It is also impossible to receive them, - by means of deduction - from the old theoretical concepts. And, meanwhile, in real history physics (and science in a whole) such ideas from time to time appear. After all, without them it would be impossible to offer a theoretical explanation of the new open phenomena: without them there is no adequate reflection of the objective essence of these phenomena, which - in its content - does not coincide with them (although, obviously, in the way of existence from them is inseparable). There is an activity of cognition: the speculative nature of abstract theoretical concepts and “visible” - from the point of view of our (macroscopic) experience - of theoretical ideas is not limited to a passive reflection of objective reality. The speculative constructs that the theorist creates are not identical to the reality for which they are created. If successful, the construct, not coinciding with the object of reality by way ofexistence can reflect the essence of the class of similar phenomena or a specific manifestation of the essence of the class of similar phenomena. One of the main creative actions leading to new ideas is the choice (selection). Theoretical knowledge becomes true within a fixed subject area and at a fixed sensitivity of instruments if the new empirical knowledge predicted by it (within the same limits) is consistent with the experiment. Verification means determining the limits of applicability of theoretical knowledge. The article deals with one historical episode associated with the name of N. Bohr and concerning the genesis of constructs of the “speculative level”. Some of the authors interpreted his figurative statement that the theory does not seem correct to him, if it is not “crazy enough”, as a speech against logic. However, Bohr had in mind that the proposed theory must be very significantly (up to “madness”!) different from the current views and theories in the given field of science. And it is quite clear that the content of such difference (or differences) cannot be distinguished without logic. Similarly, compliance or noncompliance of the theory content with the content of these experiences cannot be set without logic. In conclusion, the article considers an example of how the concept of the “speculative level of cognition”, developed by Bransky, allows us to advance in the development of the foundations of the concept of synergetics.