Locke's Criticism of Wittgenstein

Abstract

In his book Myself and Others,l Don Locke seeks to show that Wittgenstein made an illegitimate use the Private Language Argument. He thinks that private language is, in philosophical contexts, one two things : either (i) it is language which only one person can understand , or (ii) it is a language in which terms refer to 'private objects ', items which only one person is and can be aware, e.g. bodily sensations (p. 72). Wittgenstein was right, Locke says, to argue that (i) is incoherent; but wrong in that he considered the impossibility (i) as proof the impossibility (ii): The conclusion the private language argument-that word like 'pain ' does not and cannot name, refer to, private object, which only the one person is aware of-is grossly implausible. (p. 93) Thus, in Locke's view, Wittgenstein thought that the denial private meaning entailed the denial private reference. Indeed, Locke even accuses Wittgenstein failure to distinguish meaning and reference (p. 99). P. T. Geach, on the contrary, has argued: What Wittgenstein wanted to deny was not the private reference psychological expressions-e.g. that stands for kind experience that may be quite 'private '-but the possibility giving them private sense-e.g. giving sense to the word pain by attending to one's own pain-experiences, performance that would be private and uncheckable.2 In this paper I shall maintain Geach's position by arguing that Locke has grossly misunderstood Wittgenstein's argument. It is certainly true that in some sense 'private object', Wittgenstein denies that there can be private object language, and that, in some sense 'private object' Locke asserts that there can be private object language. But Locke himself distinguishes two senses 'private object': it can either mean which only the one person can know of or something which only one person can (p. 102). Now, private object language, according to the first these senses, would be type (i) private language and hence, Locke agrees with Wittgenstein, incoherent. One might suppose, then, that Wittgenstein is denying the existence private object language in this sense, and not in the other. Locke thinks that this is part what he is doing and that it is this which enables him to say that 'only I can know that I am in pain' is either false or meaningless (Investigations ? 246). But Wittgenstein makes the mistake, apparently, thinking that this shows the incoherence private object language in the second sense. Locke puts it thus : The absurdity 'Only I know whether I feel pain' is supposed [viz. by Wittgenstein] to show that words like 'pain' cannot refer to private objects,