Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Abstract

Abstract This book offers a new perspective on John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project and the philosophical debates of his day. Ruth Boeker’s interpretation emphasizes the importance of the moral and religious dimensions of his view. She argues that taking seriously Locke’s general approach to questions of identity over time, means that his account of personhood should be considered separately from his account of personal identity over time. On this basis, Boeker argues that Locke endorses a moral account of personhood, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, and that his particular thinking about moral accountability explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity over time. Moreover, she shows that Locke’s religious beliefs in an afterlife and a last judgement make it attractive to distinguish between the ideas of persons, human beings, and substances, and to defend a consciousness-based account of personal identity. In contrast to some neo-Lockean views about personal identity, she argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is not psychological per se, but rather his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs are relevant for understanding why he argues for a consciousness-based account of personal identity. Taking his underlying background beliefs into consideration not only sheds light on why many of his early critics do not adopt Locke’s view, but also shows why his view cannot be as easily dismissed as some of his critics assume.