Abstract
In this article, I discuss how Locke's account of virtuous moral obligation fits with his theory of individual rights, with specific attention to his account of ownership. I suggest that the best way to make sense of the relationship between the competing concepts of rights and virtue in Locke's thought is through the idea of imperfect duties: moral duties that do not necessarily have a legal equivalent. These duties indicate how a teleological account of morality can exist within the framework of a commitment to individual rights while also raising questions about how a Lockean government should act in regard to them. I identify the imperfect duties involved in the ownership of property and tentatively explore Locke's scattered recommendations for ‘the art of governing’ individuals.
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