Lock-in Strategies in International Negotiations: The Deconstruction of Bargaining Power

Abstract

There are hardly any instances of international negotiations, in which states do not at least partially recur to bargaining strategies. This article argues that bargaining power is ultimately a social construction, depending on perceptions about the plausibility of the realisation of a threat. Effective bargaining rests on the credibility of the threats made (e.g. no-vote, veto). Thus, even weak states can sometimes manipulate the threat-potential of seemingly more powerful actors and, thereby, punch above their weight in international negotiations. To trigger a loss of bargaining power, these states need to apply lock-in strategies that create linkages between the issue on the international negotiation agenda and other international or sub-level norms or policy commitments. Once such linkages are made, international-level bargaining threats of formerly powerful actors lose credibility as carrying them out would bring about severe reputation damages. This article distinguishes between different lock-in strategies and draws on three case studies (UNGA resolutions on African descend, on Myanmar, and on the Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone) to provide an empirical plausibility probe on the scope conditions under which the lock-in strategies are effective in reducing the power of seemingly strong actors in international negotiations.