Location Privacy-Preserving Distance Computation for Spatial Crowdsourcing

Abstract

Data privacy, especially location privacy, is paramountly important for protecting individual's information in smart cities in the big data era. One of the examples is in spatial crowdsourcing (SC). It enables people not only to issue spatiotemporal tasks to ask for help as requesters but also to solve others' tasks as workers on the SC platform. While SC brings convenience to people, it also produces severe location privacy problems, which have been recently paid more attention from both academia and industries. In this article, we address the location privacy problem in SC in a practical and secure way. We propose a location privacy-preserving framework for almost all existed mainstream distance computations in the SC system, namely, Euclidean-L3P, Minkowski-L3P, Manhattan-L3P, and Chebyshev-L3P, among which the first two are constructed based on homomorphic encryption and composite-order multilinear mapping while the latter two on the homomorphic encryption and prefix membership verification approach. Location privacy is resolved because of the above techniques having enabled that all distance computations are evaluated through ciphertexts without disclosing any location information. Security analysis shows that our framework can prevent a strong adversary from obtaining participants' location privacy. Performance analysis evaluates computation and communication overheads between protocols. The results show that Euclidean-L3P is more efficient than Manhattan-L3P and Chebyshev-L3P in terms of computation overheads when the SC applications require a small number of participants, a large plaintext space, and a small number of base stations. Moreover, compared with Manhattan-L3P and Chebyshev-L3P, Euclidean-L3P is a better choice in terms of communication overhead.