Abstract

Mobile Crowd-Sensing (MCS) is a dominant sensing paradigm for Internet of Things (IoT), with a lot of potentials as it allows data collection through the user's sensor embedded mobile devices. The participation of people in IoT not only brings greater flexibility and sensing ability but also increases the risk of privacy breaches to the participants. Primarily, a worker's location data is vulnerable to information leaks as the task assignment in MCS is location-based. Most existing mechanisms that preserve worker's location in MCS are designed under the assumption that the platform is trusted, which may be not valid in real-world applications. Besides, the existing studies focus either on task selection problem for workers or task assignment problem for the platform. Therefore, this paper investigates both task bidding and assignment while preserving location privacy. We propose two task selection strategies: Minimize Total Cost (MTC) and Minimize Average Cost (MAC). Each worker submits a cost that is obfuscated using differential privacy to the platform. We propose probability cost-efficient worker selection mechanism (PCE-WSM) to determine winners and probability individual-rationality critical payment mechanism (PIR-CPM) to determine payments to winners. We prove that PIR-CPM is truthful and can achieve probability-individual rationality by theoretical analysis. To evaluate our proposed strategies, we conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, and the experimental results validate that PCE-WSM can achieve enough privacy preservation without incurring a high payment.

Highlights

  • With the growing popularity of smartphones, mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) is becoming an emerging sensing paradigm for Internet of Things (IoT)

  • We propose a location privacy-aware task bidding for workers, and provide two task selection mechanisms: Minimize Total Cost (MTC)-TSM and Minimize Average Cost (MAC)-TSM

  • To allocate tasks efficiently in Mobile Crowd-Sensing system, we model the interaction between the platform and workers as a reverse auction

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

With the growing popularity of smartphones, mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) is becoming an emerging sensing paradigm for Internet of Things (IoT). The workers submit a bid with the selected tasks, obfuscated cost, and differential privacy budget to the platform for selling their sensing service. The studies in [26], [27] focused on the task selection problem with location privacy preservation and proposed efficient task selection mechanisms to maximize workers profits. The most related work is [31], which achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, and high computation efficient task assignment mechanism It does not consider bid privacy, and the workers’ real cost is known to the platform. 2) WORKER SELECTION PROBLEM The platform aims to select a set of workers S, with obfuscated bid price, such that the total cost of all tasks can be minimized. This makes it challenging to design a payment determination mechanism satisfying Individual Rationality and Truthfulness

LOCATION DISCLOSURE THREATS DURING TASK BIDDING
LAPLACE MECHANISM
PRUNING STRATEGY
PROBABILISTIC INDIVIDUAL-RATIONALITY CRITICAL PAYMENT MECHANISM
Findings
VIII. CONCLUSION
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