Abstract

Neoclassical economics is characterized by methodological individualism, i.e. “the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties, goals, and beliefs” (Elster (1982), p 453)2. In economics these “properties, goals, and beliefs” are taken as given, but some other social sciences try to go further and explain where they come from; still others deny that social phenomena can be reduced to the level of individuals. Despite their differences, all these approaches posit a feedback mechanism between individuals and the social environment as it changes over time. The purpose of this paper is to look into a possible such feedback mechanism for the issue of cooperation and to compare its approach, methods and results with those of “standard” game-theoretic models.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call