Abstract
An explanation of the implications for the labor demand of local publ ic sector units when decision making is jointly in the hands of elect ed politicians valuing their security of office and a permanent burea ucracy gaining satisfaction from employment size. The constraints on their behavior come from tax-paying voter-consumers and a grant-award ing higher government which also sets minimum standards of service pr ovision. While the argument is developed in terms of a Stone-Geary fo rmulation, empirical considerations dictate the estimation of an appr oximate system. The central hypotheses do not receive strong support, although a clear role emerges for ideology. Copyright 1987 by Scottish Economic Society.
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