Abstract
A simple economic theory may provide at least a partial explanation for the ticket splitting pattern that has been observed at the federal level in the United States: where Republicans do better in races for the White House than in contests for Congressional seats. To the extent that Democratic legislators, because of their ideology, are more willing to forgo national policymaking for local benefit-seeking than their Republican counterparts, rational voters have an investment incentive to: (1) lean Democratic when it comes to casting ballots for an individual representative to Congress — thereby attempting to secure as large as possible a slice of the total government spending pie; and (2) lean Republican when it comes to races for the presidency — so as to limit the net losses imposed by the prisoner's dilemma game that local benefit-seeking by Congressional representatives entails.
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