Abstract
Numerous scholars view the late 1800s as a period o f considerable party influence and little group influence. I show that in the area o f pension policies for Union veterans, entrepreneurial group politics thrived in the late 1800s and rivalled party influence. A rational choice framework is used to analyze the ability of a lobbyist entrepreneur to profit from the complex interactions between Union veterans, Congress, the Pension Bureau, and the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). I argue that lobbyist entrepreneurs operate with recognition of the opportunities for delegation from individuals to the group and from legislators to bureaus and groups. The viability of the group's linkage function depends upon the entrepreneur's abilities to master the intricacies of delegation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
