Lobbying on the BEPS Project? Assessing the Influence of Different Interest Groups

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of firms, the tax profession, and civil society on tax legislation in the context of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project against international tax avoidance. Based on content analysis, we simultaneously study two lobbying levers that interest groups can deploy via sending comment letters: taking a position of support or opposition to proposed tax rules and providing individual proposals to modify these rules. The two levers differ in their complexity and thereby the degree of asymmetric information between interest groups and the OECD. Our analysis results in three findings. First, asymmetric information limits civil society’s influence. Second, the tax profession as mediator between firms, society, and the tax authorities is significantly more successful with both lobbying levers than firms. Third, alliances and mobilization of many commenters with shared interests seem to be a promising lobbying strategy for firms.