Abstract
Interest groups have a vital role in international negotiations and carry the potential to influence their outcome. This article contributes to discussions surrounding Brexit and institutional change in the EU, focusing on Article 50 negotiations and stakeholder engagement. Drawing from theories on deliberative democracy and institutional legitimacy, we argue that different groups are given access to the Chief Negotiator depending on the resources they can contribute. Assessing our expectations, we inspect the entire interest group population that held meetings with Michel Barnier and his team from 2016 onwards. On the aggregate, we observe a pluralist approach. A closer inspection reveals a tightly knit circle of insiders that hold unparalleled access. To the extent that these meetings offer a glance into the future of EU lobbying, European trade and professional associations are likely to observe growing cohesion and significance. Conversely, UK private interests will see their presence and influence diluted as their relevance grows smaller in Brussels. Following the trends we observe, think tanks and socioeconomic interests are likely to experience a continuous surge in their involvement in stakeholder activities.
Highlights
Negotiations between the EU and the UK about the latter’s withdrawal from the block, resemble a high-politics international affair
In support of stakeholder engagement, the EU’s Chief Negotiator (CN) and his T50 team meet with interest groups
This article’s aim was to assess which groups meet with the CN, why do some groups meet with the CN more often than others, and to estimate a future trajectory of stakeholder mobilization in the EU after the UK’s departure
Summary
Negotiations between the EU and the UK about the latter’s withdrawal from the block, resemble a high-politics international affair (see Leruth, Gänzle, & Trondal, 2019; Rosamond, 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2018). The task is highly political in the sense that both negotiators emphasize normative ethical and ideological positions to justify and motivate actions, effectively framing the process as a zero-sum game (see Barley & Kunda, 1992; Patzer, Voegtlin, & Scherer, 2018) Through these formal meetings the CN employs interest groups to explore, legitimate, and disseminate his position. They serve a bridge-building role, offering a closed setting where central interests can exchange opinions and reach compromise (Dryzek & List, 2003; Eriksen, 2018; Goodin, 2008), favouring economic interests These meetings act as a depolarizing chamber allowing third party perspectives to enter the negotiating space and provide value consensus (see Estlund, 2009; Landemore, 2012; Naurin, 2007), favouring epistemic interests. The article proceeds with a theoretical section that provides our central argument and expectations, followed by a section on the research design, which is proceeded by the analysis and a discussion on the implications
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