Abstract
This paper presents a model in which two organized groups spend real resources to influence a country's tariff policy. Being ‘small’ is shown to be advantageous in lobbying activities. The size of a group is measured by its share of national income. A small group bears only a small share of the deadweight loss which its lobbying and consequent deviation from free trade creates. Under plausible conditions, this advantage enables the smaller group engaged in lobbying to obtain trade restrictions which it views as beneficial.
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