Lobbying across the USA: from state vetoes to federal venues

Abstract

Drawing on the veto player and multilevel lobbying literatures, the article analyzes the impact of policymaking vetoes on cross-territorial lobbying patterns. This comparative study of the American states finds that the incidence of federal lobbying by state interest groups and corporations is higher from states with divided government. Federal lobbying is higher also from states with unified Democratic Party control. The findings of a two-level statistical analysis of Lobbying Disclosure Act data from 2005 to 2015 suggest that subnational actors partially redirect their lobbying effort to the federal level when state policymaking channels are blocked. The empirical analysis builds on a multilevel interactive game and is supported further by a case study of lobbying patterns that followed the 2010 elections, when the Republican Party gained control of many state legislative chambers. Future research on lobbying in multilevel polities must simultaneously consider the relative powers of government levels and the partisan control of those levels.