L’éléatisme négatif de Zénon d’Élée : étude de trois paradoxes zénoniens au service du monisme de Parménide

Abstract

Parmenides, father of philosophy from a thematic point of view for having inaugurated the reflection on being, is, in the repertoire of ancient philosophical systems, presented as an absolute monist, which will earn him, moreover, the remonstrances of one of his most illustrious admirers, Plato, who holds him to be the father of right philosophy. Indeed, in the system of Parmenides, his ontology, the existence of being is increased so that no other existence is possible, mainly that of its counterpart, which is non-being, and that of movement. There’s only being. There’s only being (Pourquoi cette répétition? Il faut vous rapprocher d’un traducteur pour vous traduire cette phrase). A dry monism which can be translated by these verses of the Poem: “that It is, and that it is impossible for anything not to be” (Parmenides, Poem, II, v. 3: ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι µὴ εἶναι). This thesis, on which are grafted all the views of Parmenides, will be taken to task by the young Pythagoreans, the atomists but also the first generation of sophists. Despite these joint attacks, the Eleatic system will resist. Better still, he will counter-attack through the intermediary of the most famous disciple of Parmenides, Zeno of Elea. The latter seems not to have developed an autonomous and positive system. All his work is resolved in a defense of the system erected by Parmenides. To do this, he will develop a series of paradoxes, four following what Aristotle reported, to respond to the informers of the old Eleatic. This essay would like to examine three of them.