Living in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology

J Aaron Simmons

doi:10.1515/opth-2019-0014

Abstract

Abstract In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines. I then go on to suggest that this epistemic view allows for a recognition of different discursive loyalties. In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence. In this way, I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account.

Highlights

In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines
In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence
I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account

Summary

Thomas and Anselm: a contemporary restatement of a classical disagreement

There are all sorts of reasons that make evidence more or less compelling—prior beliefs, experiential backgrounds, cultural commitments, etc. To act as if there is some epistemic standard (Christian revelation, say) that cuts across all discourses is unlikely to blur the boundaries of theology and philosophy, but more likely to minimize the social relevance of theology and philosophy, and the humanities more generally, in relation to STEM disciplines, which tend to fare better in relation to the rhetoric of “universality,” “neutrality,” and “objectivity.”[19] Given the broadly postmodern epistemic sympathies of Plantinga-type views, such an outcome is ironic, but directly at odds with their own stated project of celebrating the legitimacy of differently conceived basic beliefs Despite this irony, such unintended consequences loom large as worries to be taken seriously as implications that might follow from allowing one set of authorities to override those operating in different discursive communities. We can all read widely and engage more openly without having to risk walking on top of each other such that philosophy of religion becomes philosophical theology in disguise

The existential stakes of epistemology

Conclusion: living in the margins