Abstract

AbstractThis article proposes an analytical model of implementation that is used to examine the implementation of the European Union's cultural heritage policy in Bulgaria. It begins by outlining a rational choice framework conceptualizing implementation as a three‐stage game with key roles for an enforcer, domestic policy‐makers and implementing actors. This model is then applied to the case of transposition and implementation of the EU rules regarding cultural heritage in Bulgaria. Different implementation outcomes stemming from one and the same formal policy are found. To explain the variation of implementation outcomes, the theorized model is applied and it is found that, given the high levels of polarization between political decision‐makers, the implementing actors have broad discretion to apply different informal policies. The analysis of implementation also shows that under these conditions implementing players have followed their normative orientations to apply different policies as if they live in parallel universes of implementation.

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