Abstract

Abstract The current study discusses differences between Russia and the Baltic States in terms of their strategic narratives, as well as how they interpret key terms and concepts in the field of security. To frame the scope of the study, the strategic narrative of Russia for the Baltic countries and the Baltic strategic narrative(s) for Russia are compared and analysed. Both sides are also locked within the bigger framework of European Union’s economic sanctions against Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance’s deterrence concept. On the other hand, the Baltic States and Russia have a lot to gain from possible improvements in economic relations and reduction of regional security tensions.

Highlights

  • The Russo–Georgian War and Crimean annexation have revealed a gap between strategic and historical narratives, political discourses and moral assessments of Russia and of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)

  • While the Baltic States consider Russia as a significant, or even the most significant, threat to their national security (Dennison et al, 2018), the Russian political elite shares the view that Russia intends to act as a key security provider in the region; the Baltic region is not their priority in the strategic level (e.g. Gerasimov, 2016; Rogozin, 2011; Karaganov and Suslov, 2018)

  • Studies (Ellyatt, 2016; Ponomareva and Frolov, 2019; Karaganov, 2018; Veebel 2019) have revealed that the Russian political elite is trying to construct the identity of the “Russian world” that is based on the positive attitude towards a joint communist past, and that any attempts to oppose this narrative are considered as attacks against the collective identity of Russia, and as a threat to Russia’s security

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Summary

Introduction

The Russo–Georgian War and Crimean annexation have revealed a gap between strategic and historical narratives, political discourses and moral assessments of Russia and of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). European Union, 2017), while Vladimir Putin (representing the Russian political elite) has argued that Russia had the right to do that, relying on the common historical legacy of Crimea and Russia and actual force deployment in the area He stated that no violation of international law has taken place related to Ukraine in 2013–2014 and called other countries, from the United States and Germany up to the Baltic States, to understand Russia’s recent action based on their own historical experience (President of Russia, 2014). The story concludes that people make conclusions based on their expectations, subjective and limited knowledge, and experience and often ignore other people’s knowledge and experience This mirroring effect, as we call it, applies to the question of why Russia and the Western countries, referring, for example to the Baltic States, see the security agents, ambitions and dynamics so differently (but not necessarily contradictorily) in terms of aims, ambitions, centres of gravity and red lines. The theory of social representations suggests that people’s aspiration to sense and explain the things around them is closely linked to the wish to protect their own identity against some shocks

The roots and context of Russia’s strategic narrative
Russia’s strategic narrative for the Baltic countries
The Baltic narratives on Russia
Conclusion
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