Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan William Marvel Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan. By Eric J. Wittenberg. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002. Pp. xxi, 250. Cloth, $24.95.) The two best-known cavalry commanders in the eastern theater of the Civil War, J. E. B. Stuart and Phil Sheridan, both seemed to enjoy considerable professional and historiographical luck, and neither appears to have entirely merited the exalted professional reputation he gained in life or death. Stuart still awaits a truly critical analysis, but Eric Wittenberg's reassessment of Sheridan pares him down to size at last, offering not only a well-deserved denunciation of his deplorable personal traits but a scathing indictment of his performance as a soldier. The book focuses on the period between Sheridan's rise from company rank to his "finest moment" in the Appomattox campaign, with the preponderance of the text devoted to his single year with the Army of the Potomac. The first of the seven chapters encapsulates Sheridan's career in introductory fashion, but five of the other six chapters wear pejorative titles or subtitles that sound like the specifications of a court martial, and Wittenberg—an attorney, as it happens—presents the case against Sheridan precisely as though it were a legal brief. Like most such contributions to the arena of adversarial argument, Wittenberg's evidence seems one-sided and occasionally belabored, but most of it survives examination against the existing body of laudatory literature. Wittenberg begins by complimenting Sheridan for the 1862 fight at Booneville, Mississippi, where he won his brigadier's star, and for a good defensive performance at Stone's River, but that is about all the praise he offers until the final campaign. Wittenberg faults Sheridan for repeated disobedience of orders that Sheridan (and his biographers) usually characterized as misunderstandings, and indeed those "misunderstandings" arose often enough to suggest willfulness by their very frequency. In this book Sheridan bears the blame for initiating the needless and indecisive battle of Perryville, and for abandoning the field of Chickamauga in the company of his army commander. He redeemed himself at Chattanooga, but only through insubordination: his unilateral decision to assault Missionary Ridge caught [End Page 342] his corps and army commanders unprepared, and succeeded only because of circumstances that Sheridan could probably not have predicted. Such uncooperative recklessness ruined many a general, but Sheridan was one of those who, by sheer chance rather than any extraordinary ability, profited from it. That random fortune, and a willingness to flagrantly distort the record into flattering form at any cost, combined to propel his reputation. Sheridan's luck included the attraction of patrons like Ulysses Grant, who infallibly rewarded and protected him like an indulgent father with a spoiled child, and Wittenberg's sharp criticism of Grant's favoritism forms another valuable feature of this work. One impression comes clear: Sheridan's career would have ended in short order had he ever served as the subordinate of someone so hypocritically demanding as himself. Wittenberg finds little to admire about Sheridan's career as the head of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, or as commander of the Army of the Shenandoah. Throughout 1864 he hoarded the credit for victories won through the plans and achievements of his subordinates, blaming all his failures on others, and all the while he obstinately ignored orders from headquarters. Sheridan's greed for glory probably motivated his removal of Gouverneur K. Warren from command of the Fifth Corps at the moment of victory at Five Forks—the crowning shame for which Sheridan most deserves to be remembered. Like others over whom Sheridan lorded his authority, Warren suffered the unjust destruction of his career, and all efforts to clear his name collided with the same clique of western generals who shielded each other in disputes with their eastern counterparts. Even after a court of inquiry belatedly acquitted Warren after long and detailed study of the matter, William T. Sherman dismissed the findings in his capacity as general-in-chief, insisting that he felt Sheridan had been "perfectly justified...