Abstract
Library information science (LIS) should develop its foundation in terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless suggestion. Where else could information science look for its conceptual foundations if not in PI? However, accepting this proposal means moving away from one of the few solid alternatives currently available in the field, namely, providing LIS with a foundation in terms of social epistemology (SE). This is no trivial move, so some reasonable reluctance is to be expected. To overcome it, the proposal needs to be more than just acceptable; it must be convincing. In Floridi (2002a), some of the reasons PI can fulfill the foundationalist needs better than SE can were articulated. This contribution aims to clarify some aspects of that proposal in favour of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI.
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