Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group

Abstract

This article examines the factors that may lead previously radical and militant Islamist movements to de-radicalize, and in so doing alter their ideologies, strategies, and objectives. In particular it will focus on the process of de-radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group, a former ally of al-Qa'ida. It will conclude with a tentative framework explaining the causes behind de-radicalization as well as policy recommendations. In July 1997, the historical leadership1 of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Group (IG), the largest armed Islamist movement in Egypt, declared a unilateral ceasefire that surprised many observers, officials, and even many IG members. The ceasefire declaration contradicted the unwaveringly militant literature of the group, the vows of its leaders to continue the armed struggle until it toppled President Husni Mubarak's regime, and the increasingly violent tactics that the IG affiliates have used since the late 1970s. In 2002, the leadership of the IG not only dismantled its armed wings, but also renounced its radical literature, published new books, and replaced its curricula with those of the relatively moderate Muslim Brothers (MB).2 Members of the shura (consultative) council of the IG issued several tracts explaining its new non-violent ideology, a move which indicated a de-radicalization process that took place not only on the behavioral (strategic/tactical) level but also on the ideological level. This process, as I shall demonstrate in the article, was relatively successful, as it took around 15,000 to 20,000 IG militants away from the Salafi-Jihadi3 camp currently led by al-Qa'ida.4 In addition, other Islamist movements have shown observable rhetorical, behavioral, and ideological changes. Like the IG of Egypt, the military wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),5 the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1997. The ceasefire led to disarmament and demilitarization processes that aimed for the reintegration of the AIS members as well as other armed Islamist factions into the Algerian civilian society. The demilitarization process included subgroups from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) that led the United Tajikistani Opposition (UTO) in the civil war of 1992-1997, re-led the UTO again into a peace agreement, albeit fragile, with the Tajik regime. Similar to the IG in Egypt and the AIS and other militant factions in Algeria, the IRP called for jihad in 1992 and then for a ceasefire, a compromise, and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in 1997. In other predominantly Muslim states, several Islamist movements have been engaging in electoral politics. Those movements include the Muslim Brothers in Egypt; the Islah (Reform) Party in Yemen; the Popular National Congress in Sudan; the Islamic Society6 and the Islamic Union7 in Afghanistan; al-Da'wa (The Call) Party, the Islamist Party, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). In addition, moderate Islamist movements have been leaning towards a relatively liberal trend8 like the Justice and Development Parties in Turkey (AKP) and alWasat (The Center) group in Egypt. Given these changes within movements that have long glorified violent struggle and upheld continuity, the main research question that this article will attempt to answer is: why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies, and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process?9 In other words, can militant, Islamist radicals turn into relatively peaceful groups that accept the other, and if so, under what conditions? In an attempt to answer this research question, I begin by providing definitions of key terms and concepts as well as a typology of Islamists. In the second section, I provide a brief synthesis of some of the literature on the causes of radicalization and moderation of Islamists. Then, I underline what I perceive as gaps in the literature and situate the article and its expected contribution. …