Linsky, Quine, and Substitutivity

Abstract

It has been argued by Linsky that the principle of inter-substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in sentences (PS) 1B just false, that is such that no two terms obey it ([l ] i 100). What Linsky has criticized is a characterization of PS provided by Quine in Reference and Modality ([il], 139). An alternative characterization of PS has been employed by Quine in Word and Object ([ill], 1^3). I will argue that Linsky's criticisms, given a certain qualification, are appropriate when construed as criticisms of PS as characterized in [II]i but I will subsequently argue that Quine's characterization in [ill] both (1) entirely escapes Linsky's criticisms and (2) constitutes an adequate analysis of PS.