Linking Border Disputes and War: An Institutional-Statist Theory

Abstract

Boundary disputes are among the most explosive international flashpoints. They frequently correlate with militarised interstate disputes and are more likely to lead to high intensity conflict than other kinds of frictions. Although analysts have been turning increasing attention to the topic of boundary tensions, significant knowledge gaps remain. We still do not know exactly what factors cause some border controversies to emerge or spur others to intensify to the point of war. One reason is that the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to the socially-constructed nature of boundaries. Another reason is that researchers have not adequately accounted for the causal import of domestic politics. Herein, I offer a novel, two variable explanation, which I term institutional-statist theory, to explain when border disputes will result in war. My theory stresses the functional value of the contested boundary as well as the disputants' level of stateness. I test the usefulness of my theory through a case study of the Indo-Pakistani boundary conflict between 1947 and 1965. My theory illuminates why war occurred in 1947/1948 and 1965, and why peace was obtained between the wars. In contrast, competing approaches have difficulty explaining the wars, their timing, or the peace between 1948 and 1965.