Abstract
This paper presents a feasibility study to protect smart card software against fault-injection attacks by means of link-time code rewriting. This approach avoids the drawbacks of source code hardening, avoids the need for manual assembly writing, and is applicable in conjunction with closed third-party compilers. We implemented a range of cookbook code hardening recipes in a prototype link-time rewriter and evaluate their coverage and associated overhead to conclude that this approach is promising. We demonstrate that the overhead of using an automated link-time approach is not significantly higher than what can be obtained with compile-time hardening or with manual hardening of compiler-generated assembly code.
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