Abstract
Due to the decline of the Analytical Philosophy of Science empirical disciplines may be treated not only as the objects but also as the means of metascientific reflection. The paper investigates to what extent and in what way this general idea of 'science self-applied' put forward by Quine manifests itself with respect to generative linguistics. Firstly, it is shown that the 'self-application' of the modularity hypothesis, which is the basic assumption of generative linguistics, yields the central thesis of a modular philosophy of science which may provide us with powerful means in tackling central problems of the philosophy of science. Secondly, the workability of the framework thus obtained is exemplified by applying it to generative linguistics itself. The analysis proves that the specific properties of two types of explanation in generative grammar can be traced back to the parametrization relation between the universal principles of the 'conceptual' and the 'motivational' module of behaviour.
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