Linguistic constitution: The accomplishment of meaningfulness and the private language dispute

Abstract

The "private language argument" has simmered in Anglo-American philosoph? ical discussion since Wittgenstein's (1967) deliberations on the possibility of such a language in the Philosophical Investigations.1 Perhaps as a side-effect of the considerable research directed towards problems of the life-world, and per? haps also as a consequence of something of a linguistic turn in the work of many contemporary phenomenologists, the private language issue has now spilled over into phenomenological philosophy.2 My purpose here is not to defend Husserl against the charge of speaking a private (and thus meaningless, or at least philo? sophically irrelevant) language. That has been done, with admirable clarity and thoroughness, by Harry Reeder (1979) and Peter Hutcheson (1981). What I do want to do here is connect this contemporary line of criticism to certain perennial doubts about phenomenological philosophy in general and the phenomenological orientation in sociological and psychological research in par? ticular.3 Briefly stated: these doubts concern the extent to which the results of phenomenologically oriented research are limited?in their relevance or validity?to the researcher. The suspicion here seems to be prompted by the re? flexive character of the phenomenological method: how can a procedure which begins in reflection upon my own experience ever escape from the limitations of that sphere? To what extent, and how, can this method yield "public," rather than "private," data? My suggestion is that this line of criticism has its founda? tion in a basic (and difficult to avoid) misunderstanding of the sphere of investi? gation proper to phenomenological inquiry. The comparatively recent interest in 'For an overview of the issue, see Saunders and Henze (1967, pp. 3-23). The two senses of